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The Case of the Missing Market: the Bond Market & Why it Matters for
Financial Development
Abstract
Although the growing literature on the importance of finance in economic growth contrasts bank-based
financial systems with market-based financial systems, little attention has been paid to the role of the bond
market. Correspondingly the role of the bond market has been very small relative to that of the banking
system or equity markets in most Asian emerging economies. We argue that the underdevelopment of Asian
bond markets has undermined the efficiency of these economies and made them significantly more vulnerable
to financial crises. We begin by describing the role of financial markets and institutions in economic
development. We show that the underdevelopment of capital markets limits risk-pooling and risk-sharing
opportunities for both households and firms. The weak financial infrastructures that characterize many Asian
economies are shown to inhibit the development of bond markets relative to equity markets. The
consequences of operating a financial system with a banking sector and equity market, but without a well-
functioning bond market are profound and far ranging. Without a market-determined interest rate, firms will
lack a true measure of the opportunity cost of capital and will invest inefficiently. Opportunities for hedging
financial risks will be constrained. Savers will have less attractive portfolio investment choices and,
consequently, fewer savings may be mobilized by the financial system to fund investment. Firms may face a
higher effective cost of funds and their investment policies may be biased in favor of short-term assets and
away from entrepreneurial ventures. Firms may take excessive foreign exchange risks in an attempt to
compensate for the lack of domestic bond markets by borrowing abroad. In addition, the banking sector will
be larger than it would otherwise be. Since banks are highly leveraged, this may render the economy more
vulnerable to crisis. Certainly, in the event that a banking crisis occurs, the damage to the real economy will be
much greater than if investors had access to a well-functioning bond market, and the financial restructuring
process will be more difficult. What can be done to nurture a well-functioning bond market? We review the
key policy measures for developing a broad, deep, resilient bond market and conclude with an analysis of
recent developments in Thailand, which is broadly representative of the wide range of countries that have
highly-developed equity markets and large banking sectors, but only rudimentary bond markets. The case of
Thailand illustrates the dangers of growth without a well-functioning bond market, and it also demonstrates
how policies can be implemented to rebuild the financial system with an expanded role for the bond market
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PREFACE
The ADB Institute aims to explore the most appropriate development paradigms for Asia
composed of well-balanced combinations of the roles of markets, institutions, and governments in the
post-crisis period.
Under this broad research project on development paradigms, the ADB Institute Working
Paper Series will contribute to disseminating works-in-progress as a building block of the project and
will invite comments and questions.
I trust that this series will provoke constructive discussions among policymakers as well as
researchers about where Asian economies should go from the last crisis and current recovery.
The conference version of this paper was presented on 26 May 2000 at the ADBI/Wharton
seminar on Financial Structure for Sustainable Development in Post-Crisis Asia held at the Institute.
Masaru Yoshitomi
Dean
ADB Institute
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ABSTRACT
Although the growing literature on the importance of finance in economic growth contrasts
bank-based financial systems with market-based financial systems, little attention has been paid to the
role of the bond market.  Correspondingly the role of the bond market has been very small relative to
that of the banking system or equity markets in most Asian emerging economies.  We argue that the
underdevelopment of Asian bond markets has undermined the efficiency of these economies and
made them significantly more vulnerable to financial crises.
We begin by describing the role of financial markets and institutions in economic development.
We show that the underdevelopment of capital markets limits risk-pooling and risk-sharing
opportunities for both households and firms.  The weak financial infrastructures that characterize
many Asian economies are shown to inhibit the development of bond markets relative to equity
markets.
The consequences of operating a financial system with a banking sector and equity market, but
without a well-functioning bond market are profound and far ranging.  Without a market-determined
interest rate, firms will lack a true measure of the opportunity cost of capital and will invest
inefficiently.  Opportunities for hedging financial risks will be constrained.  Savers will have less
attractive portfolio investment choices and, consequently, fewer savings may be mobilized by the
financial system to fund investment.  Firms may face a higher effective cost of funds and their
investment policies may be biased in favor of short-term assets and away from entrepreneurial
ventures.  Firms may take excessive foreign exchange risks in an attempt to compensate for the lack of
domestic bond markets by borrowing abroad.  In addition, the banking sector will be larger than it
would otherwise be.  Since banks are highly leveraged, this may render the economy more vulnerable
to crisis.  Certainly, in the event that a banking crisis occurs, the damage to the real economy will be
much greater than if investors had access to a well-functioning bond market, and the financial
restructuring process will be more difficult.
What can be done to nurture a well-functioning bond market?  We review the key policy
measures for developing a broad, deep, resilient bond market and conclude with an analysis of recent
developments in Thailand, which is broadly representative of the wide range of countries that have
highly-developed equity markets and large banking sectors, but only rudimentary bond markets.  The
case of Thailand illustrates the dangers of growth without a well-functioning bond market, and it also
demonstrates how policies can be implemented to rebuild the financial system with an expanded role
for the bond market.
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1The Case of the Missing Market: The Bond Market and
Why It Matters for Financial Development
Richard J. Herring and Nathporn Chatusripitak†
1. Introduction
Over the last decade, interest in the role of finance in economic growth has revived. Building
from the pioneering work of Goldsmith (1965) and the insights of Shaw (1973) and
McKinnon (1973), the more recent work exams the role of financial institutions and financial
markets in corporate governance and the consequent implications for economic growth and
development. Levine (1997) and Stulz (2000) have provided excellent reviews of this
literature and Allen and Gale (2000) have extended it by developing a framework for
comparing bank-based financial systems with market-based financial systems.1 Although the
literature addresses “capital markets,” on closer inspection the main focus is really equity
markets. Bond markets are almost completely overlooked.2
Although the omission of the bond market is not defended in the literature, one could
argue that it departs little from reality. As Table 1 shows, in most emerging economies in
Asia, bond markets are very small relative to the banking system or equity markets. Moreover,
the most striking theoretical results flow from a comparison of debt contracts with equity
contracts and at a high level of abstraction bank lending can proxy for all debt. In any event,
data are much more readily available for equity markets and the banking system than for
bond markets, even in the United States.
In contrast to the academic literature, however, policymakers have become increasingly
concerned about the absence of broad, deep, resilient bond markets in Asia. The World Bank
(Dalla et al, 1995, p. 8) has published a study of emerging Asian bond markets urging that
Asian economies “accelerate development of domestic … bond markets,” and has launched
another major study aimed at helping countries develop more efficient bond markets. Along
with Malaysia, Hong Kong, China has led the way. Hong Kong, China has succeeded in
fostering development of an active fixed-income market in Exchange Fund Bills and Notes
even though the government has not run significant deficits (Sheng (1994) and Yam (1997)).
In 1998 the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC 1999) formed a study group to
identify best practices and promote the development of Asian bond markets. Much of this
official concern stems from the perception that the absence of bond markets made several
Asian economies more vulnerable to financial crisis. The Governor of the Bank of Thailand
(Sonakul (2000)) reflected this view when he observed, “If I [could] turn back the clock and
have a wish [list]…high in its ranking would be a well-functioning Thai baht bond market.”
                                                
† The authors are grateful to Franklin Allen, Jamshed Ghandi, Edward Kane, and Pongsak Hoontrakul for
insightful conversations on the role of bond markets in financial development, and to Takagi Shinji for helpful
comments on an earlier draft.
1 Hoontrakul (1996) provides a case study for Thailand.
2 Exceptions include Boot and Thakor (1997) and Hakansson (1999).
2Table 1: The Financing of Corporations†
Domestic Credit
Provided by Banking
Sector
Stock Market
Capitalization
Domestic Corporate
Debt Securities
Amount
(% GDP)
Change
(% GCF)
Total
(% GDP)
Equity Raised
(% GCF)
Outstanding
(% GDP)
Net Issues
(% GCF)
Hong Kong,    
   China
162.4 70.8 244.8 N/A 0.6 0.0
Indonesia 55.4 31.9 34.8 8.0 N/A N/A
Korea 65.7 29.5 33.5 4.0 17.4 10.9
Malaysia 93.1 43.9 269.2 14.0 23.3 18.9
Philippines 49.0 68.5 84.8 8.0 0.0 0.0
Singapore 97.3 36.1 161.6 N/A 2.7 0.0
Taipei,China 142.2 35.8 84.7 N/A N/A N/A
Thailand 100.0 31.3 65.8 6.0 3.9* 1.9
Average 95.64 43.48 122.4 8.0 8.0 5.3
Australia 74.5 28.3 94.2 15 12.0 9.2
Japan 115.2 4.5 73.9 N/A 11.7 4.0
U.K. 122.9 72.5 137.9 17 5.0 2.7
U.S. 65.6 23.2 100.5 17 25.3 9.6
Average 94.55 32.13 101.63 8.5 13.5 6.38
Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics, IMF World Economic Outlook Database, World Bank
(IFC), FIBV, Bank for International Settlements, Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission,
Bank of Indonesia, Central Bank of China, Thai Bond Dealing Center, Reserve Bank of Australia,
Beck (1999), Rajan and Zingales (1999)
In this paper we consider why bond markets are so underdeveloped relative to equity
markets and the banking sector. In addition, we investigate what the absence of a well-
functioning bond market may imply for savings, the quality and quantity of investment and
for risk management. Our analysis leads us to conclude that the absence of a bond market
may render an economy less efficient and significantly more vulnerable to financial crisis.
If a government wishes to enhance efficiency and financial stability by nurturing the
development of a bond market, what are the appropriate policy remedies? We review the key
requirements for developing a broad, deep, resilient bond market and conclude with an
analysis of recent financial development in Thailand, which is broadly representative of the
wide range of countries that have highly developed equity markets and a large banking sector,
but until very recently, only the most rudimentary bond market.
                                                
† End of year data, 1996. The banking sector includes monetary authorities, deposit money banks, and other
banking institutions for which data are available (including institutions that do not accept transferable deposits
but do incur such liabilities as time and savings deposits). Examples of other banking institutions include
savings and mortgage loan institutions and building and loan associations. The data are as reported on line 32d
in the IFS. GDP is the gross domestic product as reported on line 99b in the IFS. GCF is the gross fixed capital
formation as reported on line 93e in the IFS. Corporate debt securities are debt securities that were issued in
domestic currency by residents of the country indicated, including short-term paper (e.g. commercial paper).
* Includes financial institution bonds.
32. Overview of the Financial Sector and Flow of Funds Analysis
The impact of the financial sector on the real economy is subtle and complex. What
distinguishes financial institutions from other firms is the relatively small share of real assets on
their balance sheets. Thus, the direct impact of financial institutions on the real economy is
relatively minor. Nonetheless, the indirect impact of financial markets and institutions on
economic performance is extraordinarily important. The financial sector mobilizes savings and
allocates credit across space and time. It provides not only payment services, but more
importantly products that enable firms and households to cope with economic uncertainties by
hedging, pooling, sharing, and pricing risks. An efficient financial sector reduces the cost and
risk of producing and trading goods and services, and thus makes an important contribution to
raising standards of living.
The structure of financial flows can be captured in flow of funds analysis, a useful
analytical tool for tracing the flow of funds through an economy. This device has been used for
evaluating the interaction between the financial and real aspects of the economy for nearly half a
century (Copeland (1955) and Goldsmith (1965, 1985)). The basic building block is a statement
of the sources and uses of resources for each economic unit over some period of time, usually a
year.
Our analysis of the relationship between the financial sector and economic performance
will proceed in stages. In the first stage we consider how an economy would perform without a
financial sector in order to provide a clear benchmark for comparison. The second stage
introduces direct financial claims in an environment with severe information asymmetries. The
third stage considers financial intermediaries that transform the direct obligations of investors
into indirect obligations of financial intermediaries that have attributes which savers prefer. The
fourth stage introduces the government sector and the international sector.
Savings and investment without financial markets or institutions
In order to understand the role of the financial sector in enhancing economic performance, it is
useful to begin with a primitive economy in which there is no financial sector. Without financial
instruments each household would necessarily be self-financing and would make autonomous
savings and investment decisions without regard for the opportunity cost of using those
resources elsewhere in society.
In this case households are the fundamental economic unit of analysis and the sources and
uses of resources (Table 2) reflect the changes in each household’s balance sheet over the year.
Since, at this point financial instruments do not exist, all assets are real and there are no
liabilities (Other categories of financial instruments that will be introduced later are shaded in
gray). Changes in real assets, here the accumulation of goods, reflect savings or changes in net
worth; dissaving results in corresponding declines in real assets.
4Table 2: Sources and Uses of Funds  for the Household Sector
Uses (U) Sources (S)
D Real Assets D Net Worth
 (Savings)
D Equity D Financial Liabilities
D Direct Financial Assets D Foreign Financial Liabilities
D Indirect Financial Assets
D Claims on Government
D Foreign Financial Assets
D Total Assets DTotal Liabilities & Net Worth
The fundamental decisions that influence economic performance – how much to consume and
save; how to allocate the flow of savings; and how to allocate the existing stock of wealth –
depend on each autonomous household’s opportunities, present and expected future income,
tastes, health, family composition, the costs of goods and services, and confidence in the future.
Although barter transactions among households would permit some specialization in production,
the extent of specialization would be severely limited by the necessity for each household to be
self-financing.
By aggregating sources and uses accounts for each economic unit, a matrix of flows of
funds can be constructed for the entire economy. For illustrative purposes we present a primitive
economy with two households in Table 3. Although other sectors are listed, they are irrelevant at
this stage of the analysis because we have assumed that there are no financial instruments that
can link one sector to another. These parts of the matrix (which will be introduced later) have
been shaded gray.
5Table 3: The Flow of Funds Matrix for an Economy without a Financial Sector
Sectors Household
1
Household
2
Non-
financial
Firms
Financial
Institutions
Rest of
World
Total
FLOWS OF
REAL
INCOME
U S U S U S U S U S U S
Savings 80 40 120
Real
Assets
80 40 120
FINANCIAL
FLOWS
Equity
Fixed Income
Instruments
Indirect
Financial
Instruments
Financial
Instruments
Issued by
Foreign
Residents
Totals 80 80 40 40 120 120
In this example, we have inserted arbitrary entries for each household. Household 1 is
saving 80 units of current income, while household 2 saves only 40. If productive opportunities
were fortuitously distributed across households in such a way that each household earned
precisely the same rate of return on its stock of real assets, this economy could prosper without a
financial sector. Such an outcome is highly unlikely, however, because investment opportunities
and desired savings are apt to differ markedly across households. Moreover, there is no
assurance that households with high savings have commensurately greater or more profitable
real investment opportunities.
If, for example, household 2’s desired investment exceeded its current savings, its
investment would have to be postponed until it could accumulate sufficient savings. This would
be true even if its investment opportunities offer substantially higher returns than the investment
opportunities available to household 1. Assume further that household 1’s investment
opportunities are less productive than household 2’s. Since household 1 does not have access to
the superior investment opportunities of household 2, it may undertake inferior investment
projects or save less. Society’s flow of savings is inefficiently allocated and the stock of
investment is less productive than it might otherwise be. Both the quality of capital formation
and the quantity of future output suffer, and the standard of living in this society is less than it
would be if household 1 could be induced to transfer some of its resources to household 2 in
exchange for a financial claim.
6A “financial claim” is a contractual agreement entitling the holder to a future payoff from
some other economic entity. Unlike a real asset, it does not provide its owner with a stream of
physical services. Rather it is valued for the stream of payoffs it is expected to return over time.
The financial claim is both a store of value and a way of redistributing income over time, which
may be much more attractive to savers than the stream of services that savers could anticipate
from their own investment opportunities in real assets.
Given the assumptions in our simple case it is conceivable that a bargain could be
arranged between household 1 and household 2. In exchange for household 1’s real assets,
household 2 could issue a financial claim to household 1 that would promise a more attractive
pattern of payoffs than the investment opportunities it would have available. This reallocation of
assets between household 1 and household 2 could increase the return on capital formation for
this society. Indeed, the possibility of investing in financial claims that are more attractive than
household 1’s own real investment opportunities might even increase the savings of household 1
and thus increase the total quantity as well as the quality of capital formation. 3
Flows with direct financial claims but no secondary market
To examine how a financial sector affects the economy we will introduce the direct financial
claims suggested above. The exposition is further simplified by introducing a second sector in
the economy. Assume that firms specialize in investing in real assets financed by issuance of
direct financial claims, while households specialize in saving and investing in these direct
financial claims. Financial claims are reflected in the flow of funds accounts as sources of funds
for firms and as uses of funds for households. Households continue to hold real assets, but most
real assets appear on the balance sheets of firms. At this stage we will assume that direct claims
cannot be traded in well-organized secondary markets. Issues of direct claims are, in effect,
private placements that will be held by households until they mature or the firm is liquidated.
The flow of funds matrix in Table 4 illustrates such a system and reflects the sort of
qualitative changes that occur when an economy first begins to specialize in production. It
differs from the flow of funds matrix in Table 3 in three respects: (1) firms hold most of the real
assets; (2) households hold direct financial claims on firms in lieu of most of their previous
holdings of real assets; and (3) household savings have increased by (an arbitrary) 10 units to
reflect the enhanced level of income which could be gained from reallocating real assets to more
productive uses. Generally, the higher an economy’s per capita income, the higher the ratio of
financial assets to real assets.
                                                
 3 Higher returns on financial instruments may encourage saving; but higher returns also enable savers to achieve a
target stock of wealth with a lower rate of saving. Thus, in theory, the impact of expected returns on the overall
savings rate is ambiguous. Empirical studies across a number of countries have not been able to resolve the question.
Nonetheless, higher returns on financial instruments will induce households to allocate more savings to financial
instruments than to real assets, such as jewelry and precious metals, that do not contribute to productive investment
(and, in an open economy, to shift from foreign to domestic assets). Efficient financial markets will allocate financial
claims to projects that offer the highest, risk-adjusted returns and so income and total savings are likely to rise even
though the savings rate may not.
7Table 4: The Flow of Funds Matrix for an Economy with
Private Placement of Direct Claims
Sectors
Household
1
Household
2
Non-
financial
Institutions
Financial
Institutions
Rest of
World Total
FLOWS OF
REAL INCOME
U S U S U S U S U S U S
Savings 87 43 10 140
Real
Assets
7 2 131 140
FINANCIAL
FLOWS
Equity 60 31 91 91 91
Fixed Income
Instruments
20 10 30 30 30
Indirect Financial
Assets
Financial
Instruments
Issued by Foreign
Residents
Totals 87 87 43 43 131 131 261 261
What makes this reallocation of resources possible? What induces households to exchange
real assets for direct financial claims on firms? The simple answer is that the direct financial
claims that firms offer entail more attractive rates of return than households could expect to earn
from investing in real assets themselves. In short, they shift from real investment to the purchase
of financial claims because they expect it to be profitable to do so. But this superficial answer
ignores several important obstacles that must be overcome in order to induce savers to give up
real assets in exchange for direct financial claims.
The fundamental problem is that once savers no longer invest in real assets directly, they
must worry about the performance of those who act as their agents and undertake the real
investments to determine the returns on their financial investments. Households are confronted
with a principal/agent problem in which they must deal with the possibility of hidden actions
and hidden information (Arrow (1979)). They must be concerned about “adverse selection” –
the possibility that they may inadvertently invest in incompetent firms with poor prospects
instead of competent firms with good productive opportunities. They must also be concerned
with “moral hazard” – the possibility that firms may not honor their commitments once they
have received resources from investors. In order to protect against adverse selection and moral
hazard, households must spend resources in deciding how to allocate savings. These activities
include: (a) collecting and analyzing information about firms; (b) negotiating a contract that will
limit the firm’s opportunities for taking advantage of the saver; (c) monitoring the firm’s
8performance; and, if necessary, (d) enforcing the contract. In the absence of strong accounting
standards, good disclosure practices, strong legal protections for holders of direct claims and an
efficient judiciary and enforcement function, the information and transactions costs may be so
great that direct financing is not feasible.
In economies where the financial infrastructure – accounting and disclosure practices, the
legal framework, and clearing and settlement arrangements – is not sufficiently well developed
to support arms-length direct financial transactions, other non-market mechanisms for allocating
savings are likely to arise. Households may be linked together with firms through family groups
rather than in the marketplace.
Family ties may substitute for a strong financial infrastructure in two ways. In the absence
of strong accounting and disclosure practices, information is likely to flow more readily within
families than between unrelated parties. Moreover, reputation within the family may substitute
for information. Thus the adverse selection problem is likely to be mitigated for investment in
direct claims within the family group. Moreover, in the absence of strong legal protections for
creditors and minority shareholders, families have enforcement mechanisms that may mitigate
moral hazard, such as the threat of disinheritance, withholding of affection, or expulsion from
the family.
In the absence of efficient capital markets, family groups may serve as a quasi-financial
system pooling the savings of several related households to finance a family-controlled firm in
which the governance structure of the family substitutes for capital market discipline. As the
family enterprise succeeds, it will accumulate retained earnings that can be used to finance new
family enterprises. To some extent the growth of family-controlled industrial conglomerates in
emerging economies can be viewed as an adaptation to the absence of efficient capital markets.
In several of the emerging markets of Asia, more than fifty percent of publicly-traded
corporations are family controlled (Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (1998a)).
This mode of allocating capital has several potential disadvantages relative to that which
would take place in a well-functioning capital market. Firms are not confronted with the true
opportunity cost of funds in the economy and so investment may be too great or too small.
Similarly firms lose the aggregation of information that takes place in a well-organized capital
market and may pursue inefficient investment projects far too long in the absence of market
discipline. Finally, the economy’s reliance on financial flows within family groups raises high
barriers to entry by unaffiliated firms, allowing more attractive investment opportunities.4 
As the family financial conglomerate grows in complexity, it is likely to form an
enterprise that will coordinate financial flows within the group. This financial enterprise may
also offer services to non-family members and become a bank.
The financial sector with financial intermediaries
Banks and other financial intermediaries purchase direct financial claims and issue their own
liabilities; in essence they transform direct claims into indirect claims. The fundamental economic
rationale for such institutions is that they can intermediate more cheaply than the difference
between what the ultimate borrowers would pay and the ultimate saver would receive in a direct
transaction. Financial intermediaries enhance the efficiency of the financial system if the indirect
claim is more attractive to the ultimate saver and/or if the ultimate borrower is able to sell a direct
claim at a more attractive price to the financial intermediary than to ultimate savers.
                                                
4
 Rajan and Zingales (1999) suggest that family groups may oppose financial development because
improvements in capital markets would undermine the value of entrenched positions and increase competition.
9Table 5: The Flow of Funds Matrix for an Economy with
Private Placement and Financial Institutions
Sectors Households
Non-
financial
Firms
Financial
Institutions
Government Rest of
World
Total
FLOW OF
REAL INCOME
U S U S U S U S U S U S
Savings   145 12 5 0 162
Real
Assets
12 148 2 162 0
FINANCIAL
FLOWS
Equity 10 34 28 4 38 38
Fixed Income
Instruments
25 7 105 87 112 112
Indirect Financial
Instruments
105 3 108 108 108
Financial
Instruments
Issued by
Foreign
Residents
Totals 152 152 151 151 117 117 418 418
A comparison of the flow of funds matrix for an economy with only direct financial claims
(Table 4) with the flow of funds matrix for an economy with both direct and indirect financial
claims (Table 5) reveals a more complex pattern of financing,5 characteristic of the financial
deepening which usually accompanies economic development (Goldsmith (1965)). The
household sector has substituted much of its holdings of direct financial claims for “indirect
financial” well-functioning claims on financial firms. Correspondingly, financial firms hold
most of the direct financial claims on non-financial firms. Also, the household sector has a
better opportunity to borrow from financial institutions because the scale of borrowing by
individual households seldom warrants the heavy fixed costs of issuing a direct financial
claim.
But how can financial institutions link some savers and investors more efficiently than
direct market transactions between the household sector and non-financial firms? Several factors
                                                
 5 Yet much of the complexity is obscured by the convention of aggregating flows by sector. Financial flows among
financial firms are often very large relative to flows vis-a-vis other sectors. For example, interbank trading in the
foreign exchange markets is roughly 90% of total volume and interbank transactions in the Eurocurrency markets
are virtually two-thirds of the total.
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may explain the relatively greater efficiency of financial intermediaries. First, financial
intermediaries may be able to collect and evaluate information regarding creditworthiness at
lower cost and with greater expertise than the household sector. When some information
regarding creditworthiness is confidential or proprietary, the borrower may prefer to deal with a
financial intermediary rather than disclose information to a rating agency or to a large number of
individual lenders in the market at large.
Second, transaction costs of negotiating, monitoring and enforcing a financial contract
may be lower for a financial intermediary than for the household sector since there are likely to
be economies of scale that can be realized from investment in the fixed costs of maintaining a
specialized staff of loan monitors and legal and workout experts. In addition, by handling other
aspects of the borrower’s financial dealings, the financial intermediary may be in a better
position to monitor changes in the borrower’s creditworthiness.
Third, the financial intermediary can often transform a direct financial claim with
attributes that the borrower prefers into an indirect claim with attributes that savers prefer.
Borrowers typically need large amounts for relatively long periods of time, while savers prefer
to hold smaller-denomination claims for shorter periods of time. By pooling the resources of
many savers, the financial intermediary may be able to accommodate the preferences of both the
borrower and savers.
Fourth, the financial intermediary often has a relative advantage in reducing and hedging
risk. By purchasing a number of direct claims on different borrowers whose prospects are less
than perfectly correlated, the financial intermediary is able to reduce fluctuations in the value of
the portfolio of direct claims, given the expected return, relative to holdings of any one of the
direct claims with the same expected return. Diversification reduces the financial intermediary’s
net exposure to a variety of risks and thus reduces the cost of hedging.
The upshot is that the introduction of bank deposits is likely to mobilize additional savings
that can be used to finance investment since some households will now substitute bank deposits
for holdings of precious metal, jewelry and other durable assets that are traditionally used as a
store of wealth. The increase in the pool of savings available to finance investment and the
reduction in transactions costs in linking ultimate savers and investors will lead to an increase in
the quantity of investment. Improved evaluation and monitoring of loans made possible by the
specialization of banks may lead to better screening and implementation of investment projects
and thus improve the return on investment. These changes are reflected in Table 5 where both
household sector savings and real assets have risen. Total household savings have risen from
130 units to 145 units and retained earnings have risen from 10 units to 17 units.
Although the bank loans introduced in this section and the private placements introduced
in the preceding section are forms of debt, it is important to note that they have strikingly
different properties than marketable debt securities. A “pure loan” is a credit contract between a
borrower and a single lender. The contract is custom-tailored to meet the borrower’s financial
requirements and the lender’s need for assurances regarding the borrower’s creditworthiness.
Because the contract involves only one lender, it may be renegotiated at relatively low cost
should the borrower’s circumstances change. Often the lender has specialized expertise
regarding the business of the borrower that enables the lender to monitor the borrower’s
performance at relatively low cost. The pure loan is usually part of a relationship between the
borrower and lender in which the borrower may draw down and repay loans over time, the
lender monitors the activities of the borrower, and the borrower may purchase other services
from the lender. A pure loan is likely to be an illiquid asset because, relative to a pure security of
equal maturity, only a small percentage of the full market value of the asset can be realized if it
is sold on short notice. The fundamental problem is that it is difficult for a potential buyer to
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evaluate the credit standing of the debtor. Moreover, the transactions costs of finding a
counterparty and executing a transaction are likely to be very high because the idiosyncratic
features of a pure loan preclude the development of dealer markets.
A “pure security” in contrast is a contract between the borrower and many investors who
may be unknown to the borrower and need have no other relationship to the borrower. The
investor need not have any specialized knowledge of the borrower’s business. Each investor is
issued an identical type of claim on the borrower, which is readily transferable. Containing
fewer covenants and contingent clauses, a pure securities contract is much simpler than a loan
agreement because after the security is issued it is often impractical to renegotiate terms of the
contract with the borrower; the costs of coordinating collective action among a large number of
often anonymous investors are prohibitive.
A pure security of a given maturity is likely to have a much more liquid secondary market
than a pure loan of equal maturity. The issuance of securities in primary markets is directed to
many investors, all of whom hold identical claims and none of whom is necessarily privy to
information about the borrower not available to the others. The standardization of claims
facilitates the development of dealer markets and leads to lower transactions costs in selling
securities. Since buyers in the secondary market need not fear that sellers know more than they
about securities being offered in the market, buyers can safely ignore the identity of the seller. In
contrast, loan contracts may be highly idiosyncratic, and the originating lender may have
information about the borrower, or specialized expertise about the borrower’s business, that is
not available to potential buyers. The loan contract may also have contemplated some degree of
monitoring by the lender that the purchaser would be obliged to perform unless the loans were
serviced by the seller. These features severely limit the marketability of conventional loans.
Unless a buyer receives a full guarantee from the original lender or some trusted third party, the
buyer must make the same investment in information that the original lender made, and/or
monitor the loan agreement, perhaps without the expertise of the original lender.
 The government and international sector
In order to complete the flow of funds matrix we need to introduce two additional sectors. First,
the government sector affects the flow of funds in two distinct ways. It issues direct claims to
banks that serve as the reserve base for the money supply. It also issues direct claims to finance
its own spending when desired government expenditures for purchases of goods and services
and the redistribution of income exceed current tax revenues.
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Table 6: The Flow of Funds Matrix for a Closed Economy
With a Government Sector
Sectors Households
Non-
financial
Firms
Financial
Institutions
Government Rest of
World
Total
FLOWS OF
REAL
INCOME
U S U S U S U S U S U S
Savings 150 12 5 33 33 167
Real
Assets
7 118 2 7 134 0
FINANCIAL
FLOWS
Equity 10 34 28 4 38 38
Fixed Income
Instruments
30 10 77 97 5 45 132 132
Indirect
Financial
Assets
113 5 118 118 118
Financial
Instruments
Issued by
Foreign
Residents
Totals 160 160 101 101 127 127 45 45 423 423
Table 6 shows the flow of funds matrix that incorporates the government sector. The
government is shown with a deficit of 33 units that causes a corresponding reduction in net
savings for the economy. Some economists argue that current deficits lead to a one-for-one
increase in household savings in anticipation of higher future tax burdens (Barro (1974)).
Other economists regard this view as too extreme in light of the empirical evidence
(Hausman and Poterba (1987)). Table 6 depicts a case in which households make a partial
response to the government deficit: household savings rise from 145 units to 150 units. The
government issues 45 units of financial liabilities to fund its current and capital expenditures
as well as its subsidies to favored private sector borrowers. In our example, real sector
investment declines in spite of government subsidies to the private sector. Total real sector
assets decline from 162 units in Table 5 to 117 units in Table 6, indicative of the “crowding
out” of private sector investment by government funding demands.
Second, to complete the flow of funds, we add the international sector. As national
economies have become increasingly interdependent, cross-border financial transactions of all
kinds have become commonplace. Opening a country to trade in financial assets offers
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advantages similar to those that we observed in introducing financial instruments in the
primitive economy. World savings may be allocated more efficiently so that national income in
all countries is increased. International specialization on the basis of comparative advantage in
financial services, like international specialization in production, is likely to enhance efficiency.
Competition from foreign institutions also stimulates innovations to cut costs and expand the
range of products. Moreover, the broader range of available financial instruments enhances the
scope for diversification to reduce country-specific risks.
Table 7: The Flow of Funds Matrix for an Open Economy
Sectors Households
Non-
financial
Firms
Financial
Institutions
Government Rest of
World
Total
FLOWS OF
REAL INCOME
U S U S U S U S U S U S
Savings 155 33 28 33 183
Real
Assets
7 134 2 7 150 0
FINANCIAL
FLOWS
Equity 13 41 28 5 5 46 46
Fixed Income
Instruments
27 10 98 81 5 45 40 153 153
Indirect Financial
Assets
116 5 136 15 136 136
Financial
Instruments
Issued by
Foreign
Residents
2 30 32 32 32
Totals 165 165 139 139 141 141 45 45 60 60 550 550
Table 7 shows the complete flow of funds matrix. In this example the national economy is
running a current account deficit of 28 units. This deficit is financed by net financial inflows that
provide both debt and equity investment to the domestic economy and by drawing down some
of the domestic economy’s holdings of foreign assets. Household savings reflect the benefits of
opening the economy to the world capital market by increasing to 155 units. The non-financial
sector also benefits from the net inflow of capital. Net domestic real investment increases from
117 in Table 5 to 150 in Table 7.
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3. The Role of Financial Infrastructure and Efficient Financial Markets
The economy that we have sketched in the preceding section has a banking system, but only a
rudimentary capital market. The absence of an adequate financial infrastructure meant that direct
claims tended to be allocated through extended families rather than through arm’s-length-
transactions in the marketplace. Most corporate borrowing was in the form of bank loans.
The underdevelopment of capital markets in this economy limits risk-pooling and risk-
sharing opportunities for both households and firms. It also robs the economy of a crucial source
of information that helps coordinate decentralized decisions throughout the economy. Interest
rates and equity prices should be used by households in allocating income between consumption
and savings, and in allocating their stock of wealth. Firms should rely on financial markets for
information about which investment projects to select and how such projects should be financed
(Merton (1989)). Efficient financial markets help to allocate, transfer, and deploy economic
resources across time and space in an uncertain environment (Merton (1990)). Without efficient
financial markets, these functions are likely to be performed less well and living standards will
be lower than they might otherwise have been.
The infrastructure to support a corporate bond market includes an appropriate legal
framework, strong accounting and disclosure standards, and efficient and reliable clearing and
settlement arrangements. It is also useful to have a community of bond analysts and ratings
agencies who can help investors evaluate bonds. Moreover, as we will emphasize in Section 4, it
is essential to develop a broad, deep resilient secondary market.
In order for potential investors to be willing to accept a claim on future cash flows for the
repayment of principal and interest, they must be confident that their right to collect the
promised debt payments are well defined and enforceable. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer
& Vishny (1998) have identified six measures of creditor rights that are shown in Table 8A for
the countries in Table 1 along with a measure of contract enforceability. The measures focus on
creditors’ rights in the event of default and include reorganization procedures, priority rules, and
the scope for autonomous action by managers to evade creditors. On average the four
industrialized countries score better on these indices of creditor rights than do the eight Asian
emerging economies.
La Porta et al. have also identified five indicators of the effectiveness of the judiciary
system since, in principle, strong enforcement by the courts could compensate for weak laws.
These measures (shown in Table 8B) include proxies for the efficiency of the judicial system,
and commitment to the rule of law as well as indicators of the government’s attitude toward
business. Kane (2000a) also includes a measure of the quality of a country’s bureaucracy since
administrative efficiency may also affect the speed with which rights are enforced. Again, on
average the four industrialized countries score better on these measures of the effectiveness of
the judicial system than do the eight Asian emerging economies.
In addition to assurances regarding the legal right to the promised cash flows and the
enforceability of such rights in the event of default, a potential investor will need to form an
estimate of the probability of default and the expected recovery in the event of default. This
depends of the availability of reliable and relevant data about the firm’s current condition and
prospects as well as the availability of expert advice. La Porta et al. (1998) have identified an
index of accounting standards, which is reported in Table 8C. In addition, Kane (2000b) has
identified an index of restrictions on the press as an indication of the openness of the society and
the scope for manipulating flows of information. Again, on average, the four industrialized
countries have much better scores than the eight Asian emerging economies, although the
average masks wide variations across the eight countries.
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Table 8: Indicators of Quality of Financial Infrastructure
A. Creditor Rights
Contract
Enforceability
No Automatic
Stay on
Secured
Assets
Secured
Creditors
Paid First
Restrictions on
Autonomous
Reorganization
Management
doesn’t Stay in
Reorganization
Creditor
Rights
Legal
Reserves
Required to
Continue
Operation
Hong Kong,
   China
N/A 1 1 1 1 4 0
Indonesia 1.76 1 1 1 1 4 0
Korea 2.19 1 1 0 1 3 0.5
Malaysia 2.26 1 1 1 1 4 0
Philippines 1.75 0 0 0 0 0 0
Singapore 3.22 1 1 1 1 4 0
Taipei,China N/A 1 1 0 0 2 1
Thailand 2.23 1 1 0 1 3 0.1
Average 2.24 0.88 0.88 0.5 0.75 3 0.2
Australia 3.04 0 1 0 0 1 0
Japan 3.16 0 1 0 1 2 0.25
U.K. 3.43 1 1 1 1 4 0
U.S. 3.55 0 1 0 0 1 0
Average 3.30 0.25 1 0.25 0.5 2 0.06
Data definitions and sources:
Contract Enforceability: Measures the “relative degree to which contractual agreements are honored and complications presented by
language and mentality differences. ” Scored 0-4, with higher scores for superior quality. Source: Business Environmental Risk Intelligence,
Kane (2000b).
No automatic stay on secured assets : Equals one if the reorganization procedure does not impose an automatic stay on the assets of the
firm upon filing the reorganization petition. Automatic stay prevents secured creditors from gaining possession of their security. It equals
zero if such restriction does exist in the law. Source: Bankruptcy and Reorganization Laws, LaPorta et al (1998).
Secured creditors paid first: Equals one if secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds that result from the
disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm. Equals zero if non-secured creditors, such as the government and workers are given absolute
priority. Source: Bankruptcy and Reorganization Laws, LaPorta et al (1998).
Restrictions on autonomous reorganization: Equals one if the reorganization procedure imposes restrictions such as creditors’ consent to
file for reorganization. It equals zero if there are no such restrictions. Source: Bankruptcy and Reorganization Laws, LaPorta et al (1998).
Management doesn’t stay in reorganization: Equals one when an official appointed by the court, or by the creditors, is responsible for the
operation of the business during reorganization. Equivalently, this variable equals one if the debtor does not keep the administration of its
property pending the resolution of the reorganization process, and zero otherwise. Source: Bankruptcy and Reorganization Laws, LaPorta et
al (1998).
Creditor rights: An index aggregating different creditor rights. The index is formed by adding 1 when: (1) the country imposes restrictions
such as creditors’ consent or minimum dividends to file for reorganization; (2) secured creditors are able to gain possession of their security
once the reorganization petition has been approved (no automatic stay); (3) secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the
proceeds that result from the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm; and (4) the debtor does not retain the administration of its property
pending the resolution of the reorganization. The index ranges from 0 to 4. Source: Bankruptcy and Reorganization Laws, LaPorta et al
(1998).
Legal reserves required to continue operation: It is the minimum percentage of total share capital mandated by Corporate Law to avoid
the dissolution of an existing firm. It takes a value of zero for countries without such restrictions. Source: Company Law or Commercial
Code, LaPorta et al (1998).
Assessments not endorsed by ADB/I
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Table 8: Indicators of Quality of Financial Infrastructure (cont ’d.)
B. Effectiveness of Judicial System
Efficiency
of Judicial
System
 Rule of Law   Corruption Bureaucratic
Quality
Risk of
Expropriation
Risk of
Contract
Repudiation
Hong Kong,
   China
10.0 8.22 8.52 4.14 8.29 8.82
Indonesia 2.50 3.98 2.15 1.50 7.16 6.09
Korea 6.00 5.35 5.30 4.18 8.31 8.59
Malaysia 9.00 6.78 7.38 3.54 7.95 7.43
Philippines 4.75 2.73 2.92 1.46 5.22 4.80
Singapore 10.00 8.57 8.22 5.11 9.30 8.86
Taipei,China 6.75 8.52 6.85 N/A 9.12 9.16
Thailand 3.25 6.25 5.18 4.39 7.42 7.57
Average 6.53 6.3 5.82 3.47 7.85 7.67
Australia 10.00 10.00 8.52 6.00 9.27 8.71
Japan 10.00 8.98 8.52 5.89 9.67 9.69
U.K. 10.00 8.57 9.10 6.00 9.71 9.63
U.S. 10.00 10.00 8.63 6.00 9.98 9.00
Average 10 9.39 8.69 5.97 9.66 9.26
   
Data definitions and sources:
Efficiency of judicial system: Assessment of the “efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, particularly
foreign firms” produced by the country risk-taking agency Business International Corporation . It  “may be taken to represent investors’
assessments of conditions in the country in question.” Average between 1980-1983. Scale from 0 to 10, with lower scores for low efficiency
levels. (LaPorta et al, 1998).
Rule of law: Assessment of the law and order tradition in the country produced by the country-risk rating agency International Country Risk
(ICR). Average of the months of April and October of the monthly index between 1982 and 1995. Scale from 0 to 10, with lower scores for
less tradition for law and order. Source: International Country Risk Guide. (LaPorta et al, 1998).
Corruption: ICR’s assessment of corruption in government. Lower scores indicate “high government officials are likely to demand special
payments” and “illegal payments are generally expected throughout the lower levels of government” in the form of “bribes connected with
import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax, assessment, policy protection, or loans.” Scale runs from 0 to 6, with lower scores
indicating higher levels of corruption. Source: International Country Risk Guide. (LaPorta et al, 1998)
Bureaucratic quality: Average of “bureaucratic quality” assessment values assigned by ICRG between 1982-19995. Scored 0-6, with
higher scores for superior quality. (Kane, 2000b)
Risk of expropriation: ICR’s assessment of the risk of “outright confiscation” or “forced nationalization.” Average of the months of April
and October of the monthly index between 1982 and 1995. Scale from 0 to 10, with lower scores for higher risks. (LaPorta et al, 1998)
Risk of contract repudiation: ICR’s assessment of the “risk of modification in a contract taking the form of a repudiation, postponement,
or scaling down” due to “budget cutbacks, indigenization pressure, a change in government, or a change in government economic and social
priorities.” Average of the month of April and October of the monthly index between 1982 and 1995. Scale from 0 to 10, with lower scores
for higher risks. (LaPorta et al, 1998)
Assessments not endorsed by ADB/I
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Table 8: Indicators of Quality of Financial Infrastructure (cont ’d.)
C. Quality of Economic Information
Accounting Standards
Index of Restrictions
on the Press
Hong Kong, China 73 32.75
Indonesia N/A 71.40
Korea 68 26.40
Malaysia 79 61.00
Philippines 64 44.60
Singapore 79 63.60
Taipei,China 58 28.40
Thailand 66 39.80
Average 69.6 45.99
Australia 80 8.80
Japan 71 20.20
U.K. 85 22.20
U.S. 76 12.80
Average 78 16
Data definitions and sources:
Accounting standards : Index created by examining and rating companies’ 1993 annual reports on their inclusion or omission of 85 items.
These items fall into 7 categories (general information, income statement, balance sheet, funds flow statement, accounting policies,
stockholders’ information and supplementary information). A minimum of five companies in each country was studied. There are 1,000
industrial companies from 41 countries. The companies represent a cross-section of various industry groups. Scores are from 0-100. Higher
scores indicate better accounting standards. Center for International Financial Analysis and Research, Inc.,1995, International Accounting &
Auditing Trends, 4th ed.
Index of restrictions on the press: Assessment of repressive actions and laws, regulations, controls, and political pressures that influence
media content. Score reported is the average index assigned by Freedom House staff Annual Press Freedom Reports, 1994-1998. Scale runs
from 0 to 100, with lower scores indicating greater freedom. Kane (2000b)
Assessments not endorsed by ADB/I
Finally, a potential investor must have confidence in arrangements for the clearing and
settlement of bond trades. Creditor rights, judicial efficiency and good information will be of
little use if the investor cannot be certain of receiving the bond when payment is made. Ideally,
the clearing and settlement system should offer delivery against payment. Many of the emerging
markets in Asia are adopting such systems.
Generally countries that rate higher on indices of creditor rights, judicial efficiency, and
quality of information have larger bond markets. As we will see in Section 4, there are many
useful things that a government can do to nurture development of a strong bond market, but
these indices measure issues of fundamental importance. Indeed, Kane (2000a) has suggested
that the international financial institutions should help countries improve their rankings on such
indices and that the managers of international financial institutions should be evaluated and
compensated on the basis of their success in encouraging such improvements.
Why equity markets may exist where bond markets fail to thrive
What are the main obstacles to developing an efficient bond market? Why, in environments with
weak financial infrastructures, do equity markets appear to flourish while bond markets
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flounder? Part of the answer is inherent in the difference between debt and equity contracts.
Debt claims promise repayment of principal and interest, while equity claims promise payment
of a prorate share of profits and usually convey a proportionate vote in important corporate
governance matters.
The maximum return on a bond 6 purchased at par value is the promised interest payments.
But the downside may include loss of the principal amount as well as promised interest
payments. The bond contract defines the obligations of the borrower and remedies in the event
of default. Usually, the key remedy in the event of default is that the bondholders may seize
collateral or control of the enterprise from its owners.
The main challenge in pricing a bond is setting an interest rate that will compensate for the
opportunity cost of funds, default, purchasing power and liquidity risk as well as whatever
idiosyncratic features the bond may have, such as a call option or sinking fund. In the absence of
an active secondary market in risk-free debt of a comparable maturity, it will be difficult to
identify the appropriate opportunity cost of funds. Estimating the probability of default and the
expected recovery from the liquidation or sale of the firm in the event of default will also prove
difficult in an economy with a weak financial infrastructure. In the absence of credible
accounting practices, good disclosure practices or reliable bond ratings, it may be very difficult
to estimate a probability of default or expected loss in the event of default. This challenge is still
more difficult in the absence of clear laws setting out the bondholder’s rights in the event of
default, or an efficient judiciary that will oversee enforcement of such rights and a reliable
enforcement mechanism. If households are concerned about a high probability of default or the
expected loss in the event of default, it may not be possible to establish a viable bond market.
Borrowers may not be able to offer credibly a sufficiently high interest rate to compensate for
the perceived risk of loss (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)).
In contrast to a bond in which the upside is limited by the promised interest rate, an equity
claim has an unlimited upside return which can compensate for the perceived riskiness of the
claim. Although minority shareholders will experience the same frustrations as bondholders in
evaluating a firm’s current condition and its earnings prospects, they can take comfort in the fact
that they share an interest with the controlling shareholders and management in a rising share
price. Thus if there is an active secondary market and reliable clearing and settlement procedures
for buying and selling equity claims, an active market may develop for a firm’s equity even
though investors would not be willing to buy its debt.
What are the consequences of operating a financial system with a banking sector and
equity market, but no bond market? The implications are profound and far ranging. We will
analyze the impact on other markets, savers, investors, banks and financial development more
broadly.
Absence of bond markets: implications for other markets
In the absence of a bond market, the economy will lack a market-determined term structure of
interest rates that accurately reflects the opportunity cost of funds at each maturity. Without a
term structure of interest rates, it will be difficult to develop efficient derivatives markets that
enable economic agents to manage financial risks. Forward markets trade forward contracts that
obligate the owner to buy a given asset on a specific date at a price specified at the origination of
the contract. Since market participants always have the option of buying the asset on the spot
                                                
6 We shall use the term “bond” in the broadest sense to include all tradable fixed income instruments such as
bills and commercial paper (usually with maturities of less than 1 year), notes (with maturities of 1 to 5 years)
and bonds (usually with maturities greater than 5 years).
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market and holding it until the maturity of the forward contract, the forward price is linked to the
current price by the interest cost of holding the asset until the forward contract matures. In the
case of forward foreign exchange contracts, the relationship is a bit more complex because it
involves both foreign and domestic interest rates. The forward foreign exchange rate is related to
the spot foreign exchange rate by the ratio of (1 +) the home country interest rate relative to (1 +)
the foreign interest rate, both corresponding to the maturity of the forward contract. If there is no
market determined domestic interest rate, it may still be possible to buy a forward contract, but
the market will be very thin and transactions costs will be heavy because market-makers will not
be able to hedge their positions using the bond market.
Futures markets trade futures contracts that obligate the owner to purchase a specified
asset at a specified exercise price on the contract maturity date. Futures markets differ from
forward markets in that changes in the value of a futures contract are settled day by day as they
occur rather than at the maturity of the contract. Thus Black (1976) has described futures
contracts as a series of forward contracts that are settled daily. Again, however, a key link
between spot and futures prices is the interest rate corresponding to the maturity of the contract.
Futures contracts are exchange-traded instruments that require a significant volume of trading to
warrant the substantial fixed costs of organizing and running an exchange. Countries without a
bond market are unlikely to generate enough activity to support development of an active futures
exchange. Although Hong Kong, China; Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, and People’s
Republic of China all have futures exchange, active trading has been confined mainly to
Singapore’s International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX). Swap contracts obligate two parties to
exchange, or swap, some specified cash flows at specific intervals. The most common form is an
interest rate swap in which cash flows are determined by the two different interest rates specified
in the swap agreement. But, the swap contract can be decomposed into a portfolio of forward
contracts (Smith, Smithson and Wakeman (1986)) in which at each settlement date throughout
the term of the swap contract part of the change in value is transferred between the
counterparties. In contrast to the forward contract in which the change in value is transferred at
the maturity of the contract or the futures contract in which the change in value is transferred day
by day over the term of the contract, part of the value of the change in a swap contract is
conveyed between the counterparties at each settlement date specified in the swap contract.
Again, the key link between spot and forward rates is the corresponding interest rate.
In contrast to the owners of forward, futures or swap contracts who have an obligation to
perform as specified in the contract, the owner of an option contract has the right, but not the
obligation to perform as specified in the contract. Just as futures and swaps can be viewed as a
portfolio of forward contracts, options can be viewed as portfolios of forward contracts and risk-
free bonds. Black and Scholes (1973) have shown that a dynamic portfolio of forward contracts
on the underlying asset and riskless bonds can replicate a call option. As the price of the asset
rises, the call-option-equivalent portfolio contains an increasing proportion of forward contracts
on the asset. As the price of the asset falls, the replicating portfolio contains a decreasing
proportion of forward contracts on the asset. Like the forward, futures and swap markets, the
options market depends critically on the bond market for pricing and hedging positions.
In the absence of a well-functioning bond market, it may be possible to obtain forward,
swaps and options contracts that are specially tailored for a client. But they will be very
expensive relative to what they would cost in an economy with a well-functioning bond market
because they cannot be hedged as efficiently. The consequence is that market participants will
be exposed to more financial risk than they would choose to accept if they had access to well-
functioning derivatives markets. The events of 1997 showed that many market participants had
accepted excessive exposures to foreign exchange risk.
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The absence of a risk-free7 term structure of interest rates also makes it difficult to price
credit risk by comparing a risky asset with a risk-free asset that is alike in all other characteristics.
Although inefficiencies caused by mispricing credit risk may be second order relative to
inefficiencies that result from mispricing the risk-free rate, they nonetheless cause distortions in
the economy. Without a government bond market that establishes benchmark risk free rates at
critical maturities, it will be very difficult to establish a corporate bond market, much less a
market for high yield debt or securitized assets. Partly this is a consequence of the
microeconomics of market-making. It is easier to start a new market if the activity must cover
only the marginal cost of the new market rather than the full costs of setting up and maintaining
a market. If institutions have already invested in trading in government bonds, then the marginal
cost of introducing another fixed income market will be relatively slight.
The absence of a broad, deep, resilient bond market also causes a loss of information to
society. The differential yield between a risky bond and a risk free bond that is alike in all other
characteristics reflects a market consensus about the appropriate credit risk (and possibly
liquidity risk) premium. This market information can be used to price comparable bank loans
and it is likely to extend the range of credit risk that is priced in the market rather than quantity
rationed.
Although, as noted above, an equity market may flourish in the absence of the bond
market, it may not be very efficient in the sense of aligning prices with fundamental economic
values. Ideally, share prices should reflect the present discounted value of expected future
earnings. But in economies that lack the infrastructure to support a bond market, investors are
likely to have considerable doubt about what past earnings have been and what current earnings
are, much less what expected future earnings will be. Moreover, in the absence of a bond market
it is not clear how the appropriate discount rate should be determined. Thus shares are likely to
be priced on the basis of expectations that are often shallowly held and subject to considerable
volatility and the usefulness of share prices in allocating resources and corporate governance is
correspondingly vitiated.
Absence of bond markets: implications for savers
Without a well-functioning bond market savers face a diminished array of assets. They will hold
more substitute assets such as bank deposits and possibly, but less likely, equity and probably
more non-financial assets such as gold or jewelry that reduce the supply of savings that can be
mobilized for productive investment. They will be forced to accept a lower return for any given
level of risk or a higher level of risk for a given level of return relative to an economy with a
well-functioning bond market. As Hakansson (1999) has argued with respect to the corporate
bond market, “we can expect that a large number of these securities will be such that we will be
unable to find any portfolio of other securities in the market which can replicate their payoff
patterns across contingencies or states.” Applying his earlier theoretical work Hakansson (1982,
1992) compared equilibria with and without a well-developed bond market, and concluded that
under fairly general conditions “the financial market richer in bonds will constitute a Pareto-
improvement over the financial market in which banks do most of the lending.”
In the absence of a well-functioning bond market, specialized financial institutions with
long-term liabilities such as life insurance companies and pension funds will find it more
                                                
7 Technically, it is  not essential that the term structure be default risk free. It is necessary, however, that the
benchmark bonds that price the term structure share the same risk of default. In most markets, government
issues, which are approximately default risk free in domestic currency terms, provide the benchmarks for
estimating the term structure of interest rates.
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difficult to acquire long-term assets that match the maturity of their liabilities. And consequently,
the insurance they provide against future contingencies will be more costly.
Absence of bond markets: implications for investors
Without a well-functioning bond market, firms will lack a clear measure of the opportunity cost
of funds. From society’s perspective this may lead to over-investment if the firm’s internal rate
is too low or under-investment if the firm’s internal rate is too high. Evidence from the mid-
1990s in several dynamic Asian economies suggests that that the internal discount rate may have
often been too low because returns on investment fell markedly.
Firms will be entirely reliant on banks for debt financing. The same weaknesses in the
financial infrastructure that impede development of a bond market – inadequate accounting
and auditing, weak disclosure laws and uncertain enforcement of contracts – also lead banks
to prefer short-term credit. As Diamond (1991) has shown, short-term credit is an important
way to control borrowers when there are hidden action and information problems since it
limits the time an opportunistic firm can exploit its creditors without being in default.
Since banks typically lend for periods much shorter than the maturity of long-term bonds,
this may affect the firm’s preferred leverage. Any given leverage structure will be riskier the
shorter the maturity of the debt outstanding. Firms may attempt to compensate for this risk by
attempting to control the bank lender. As noted earlier corporate conglomerates will attempt to
affiliate with a bank in part to form an internal capital market that will substitute for the absence
of an external capital market. If the subsequent loans should go bad, this sort of relationship can
give rise to the charge of crony capitalism.
Another consequence of the reliance on short-term bank lending may be a bias in firms’
investment decisions. Based on Hart and Moore (1995), Caprio and Demirgüç-Kunt (1997)
have argued that firms will tend to match the maturity of their assets and liabilities. This
tendency has been documented in the United States and Caprio and Demirgüç-Kunt (1997)
report on World Bank studies that affirm the pattern of matching maturities of assets and
liabilities holds for developing countries as well. This suggests that reliance on short-term
bank lending will bias investment toward short-term assets. As a result there may be too little
investment in longer-term assets such as infrastructure, public utilities, housing and capital
intensive industries.
Exclusive reliance on bank lending may bias investment in another more subtle way.
Access to the bond market may play a role in encouraging entrepreneurial ventures by limiting
the ability of banks to extract rents from successful ventures. Black and Gilson (1998) have
argued that a dynamic venture capital sector will not thrive in a bank-based financial system
because successful venture capitalists need the option of exiting from the project through issue
of bonds or equity.
Some recent evidence for the bank-centered Japanese system (Weinstein and Yafeh
(1998)) suggests banks do extract rents from their dependent corporate customers. The
consequence is that the effective cost of funds is higher than it would have been if the firm had
access to a well-functioning bond market.
The largest, best-known firms may attempt to compensate for the lack of a domestic
bond market by issuing bonds in the international market. Table 9 shows corporate issues
outstanding as a percentage of GDP in 1998 for several Asian economies and a benchmark
group of high-income economies. In general reliance on international issuance of bonds was
higher in this group of Asian economies than in the benchmark group (apart from the United
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Kingdom). While this behavior is easily explained as an accommodation to the inadequacies
of domestic bond markets, it subjects the borrowers to a heavy potential cost.
Table 9: Corporate Borrowings in Domestic and International Markets†
Domestic Corporate
Debt Securities Outstanding
(%GDP)
International Corporate
Debt Securities Outstanding
(%GDP)
Hong Kong, China 1.2 8.9
Indonesia N/A 13.5
Korea 32.2 5.7
Malaysia 33.7 15.3
Philippines 0.0 9.4
Singapore 2.5 4.7
Taipei,China 1.5 2.5
Thailand 3.8* 5.2
Average 10.7 8.2
Australia 15.9 4.7
Japan 17.9 4.2
U.K. 8.2 9.1
U.S. 27.4 3.2
Average 17.4 5.3
Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics, IMF World Economic Outlook Database, Bank for
International Settlements
† End of year data, 1998.
* Includes data for financial institutions.
In general, issues on international bond markets are denominated in foreign currency, usually
U.S. dollars or euros. Thus, to the extent that borrowing firms use this source of financing to
fund activities that will have returns in the domestic currency, they will be increasing their
exposure to foreign exchange risk. As already noted, opportunities for hedging this risk in
derivatives markets are limited and generally quite expensive.
Absence of bond markets: implications for banks
Without competition from the bond market, the banking sector will be larger than it would
otherwise be. Banks will have more deposits at lower cost because their customers will have
very few other alternative, fixed-income investments and they will have more corporate loans
because their borrowers will have few other sources of debt financing. If the banking market
were highly competitive, the distortions from bank dominance of debt finance might be
relatively slight, but in most countries without a bond market the banking system is highly
concentrated. The deposit rate is not likely to reflect the true opportunity cost of funds for the
economy because of cartel pricing in some countries and because in most countries, banks
benefit from access to an implicit, if not an explicit safety net. The perception that claims on the
bank will receive some degree of protection from the government means that depositors will not
be an effective source of discipline on bank risk taking.
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It is generally argued that bank monitoring of a borrower is superior to monitoring by
bondholders because bank lenders have lower costs of collective action and can renegotiate a
loan contract at lower cost in the event that the borrower cannot meet the original repayment
schedule. This may be true in general, but recent experience has shown that if a bank is weakly
capitalized so that it cannot make a write down in a loan renegotiation without violating capital
adequacy standards, the bank may let the borrower continue negative present value projects by
funding these activities to avoid declaration of default (Herring 1989). In this circumstance
monitoring by bondholders may be preferable since they will have no motive to sustain
uneconomic activity.
The absence of a bond market precludes banks from issuing bonds, which might reduce
their exposure to liquidity risk and provide another source of market discipline.8 The virtual
absence of market discipline from debt markets places a heavier burden on bank supervisors to
curb risk taking. Like their counterparts in the industrialized world, however, bank supervisors
in emerging markets have seldom been up to the challenge. Thus, the main restraint must come
from shareholders of the bank. But in a world of implicit deposit guarantees, they have an
incentive to take greater risks. This tendency is exacerbated if the bank is controlled by interests
who are also heavy borrowers from the bank.
Even without this distortion of the incentives for risk taking, a bank that operates in an
economy without bond markets has a diminished capacity to manage risks. The thinness of
derivatives markets means that most hedging activities must involve transactions on the balance
sheet. It will be particularly challenging to deal with concentrations of credit risk since in the
absence of a well-developed bond market it will be difficult to sell or securitize loans or to
negotiate credit derivatives. And without access to a liquid bond market, banks will be more
vulnerable to a liquidity shock because they will not have the option of selling bonds in a liquid
secondary market and thus are more likely to be obliged to accept fire-sale losses on the sale of
bank loans.
Viewed from a broader perspective, the economy is at risk of crisis due to excessive
reliance on bank lending. Because banks are highly leveraged institutions, the economy is much
more vulnerable to a financial crisis than if more corporate borrowing had taken place in the
bond market and the claims were held in well-diversified portfolios. In the event of a shock that
cripples the banking system, there will be an enormous impact on economic activity because
borrowers will not be able to substitute issuance of bonds for bank borrowing. Instability in the
banking system can halt investment projects and reduce aggregate demand. Economic activity
may be depressed until the banking system can be recapitalized. As experience in Asia since
1997 has shown, this can be a very painful process.
The absence of bond markets also inhibits efforts to clean up bank balance sheets in the
wake of a crisis. From Scandinavia to the United States, Japan and several emerging economies
in Asia, governments have issued debt in exchange for non-performing loans. In the absence of
well-organized bond markets, the government debt issued is less liquid and therefore less useful
in resuscitating bank lending. More importantly, in the absence of an active fixed-income market,
it is more difficult to securitize non-performing loans so that resources can be redeployed as
rapidly as possible to restructure the economy.
                                                
8 See, for example, the recent proposal by the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee to require that all
internationally active banks be required to issue subordinated debt (Calomiris et al, 2000).
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Absence of bond markets summary
An economy that relies exclusively on banks for debt financing faces several major costs. First is
the loss of information that is contained in market determined interest rates. This impedes the
development of derivatives markets and may lead to inefficiencies in the pricing of equities.
Without a clear measure of the opportunity cost of capital, firms may invest too little or too
much and the allocation of capital will be less efficient than if the economy had the advantage of
a well-functioning bond market.
Second is the loss of welfare to savers who are less well off than they would be with the
option of investing in a well-functioning bond market. Because financial investment is less
attractive than it would otherwise be, fewer savings may be mobilized in the financial system to
fund investment.
Third, firms may face a higher effective cost of funds than if they had access to the bond
market and their investment policies may be biased in favor of short-term assets and away from
entrepreneurial ventures. If firms attempt to compensate for the lack of a domestic bond market
by borrowing in international bond markets, they may be obliged to accept excessive exposure
to foreign exchange risk. In any event, the underdevelopment of domestic derivatives market
will make it more difficult to manage financial risks.
Fourth, the banking sector will be larger than it would otherwise be. Since banks are
highly leveraged, this may render the economy more vulnerable to crisis. Certainly, in the event
that a banking crisis occurs, the damage to the real economy will be much greater than if
investors had access to a well-functioning bond market and the financial restructuring process
will be more difficult.
If the economy would be better off with a well-functioning bond market, what can the
government do to nurture it? What policies will facilitate development of a bond market? We
turn to that topic in the next section.
4. The Role of Government as Issuer
The first major bond market to develop is usually the market in government obligations. In
many countries the government has the largest stock of issues outstanding. In general, it is easier
for bond traders to price government issues where credit risk is not an important consideration.
Government bond prices can then serve as a basis for pricing the issues of other borrowers who
are subject to credit risk.
In most countries, governments issue debt to fund the gap between tax receipts and current
expenditures, and sometimes to finance some extraordinary current expenditure. (See Table 10
that shows government borrowing and government borrowing relative to borrowing by other
issuers in the eight Asian emerging economies and the four industrialized countries.) The U.S.
bond market took flight after the issuance of Liberty Bonds to finance U.S. participation in
World War I. Rajan and Zingales (1999) note that people, who would otherwise not buy a
financial security, bought these bonds for patriotic reasons. The favorable experience investors
had with these bonds left them willing to invest in securities issued by corporations. This gave
liquidity to the corporate securities market and made possible the significant expansion of these
markets during the 1920s. Does this mean that fiscally conservative governments that do not run
deficits cannot nurture a robust bond market? Hong Kong, China has shown that this need not be
true. After all, it is gross debt that matters for the development of the market, not the net debtor
position of the government. Hong Kong, China developed a benchmark yield curve in Hong
Kong, China dollars through issues of Exchange Fund Bills and Notes, the proceeds of which
are used primarily to invest in international markets, not to fund government spending.
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If the government’s objective is to nurture a robust bond market, then it should aim at
establishing a benchmark yield curve that can serve as the risk-free rate for the pricing of other
securities. This means committing to a program of regular issues at the appropriate maturities –
usually three months, six months, one year, three years, five years and ultimately ten years. It must be
recognized at the outset that the goal of developing a robust bond market may conflict with the goal
of minimizing the cost of government borrowing. 9
Table 10: Public and Total Borrowings in Domestic and International Markets†
Domestic Debt
Securities Outstanding
(%GDP)
International Debt
Securities Outstanding
(%GDP)
Public All Issuers Public All issuers
Hong Kong,
   China
3.3 17.4 4.7 19.5
Indonesia N/A 1.5 0.7 18.2
Korea 16.2 75.7 7.2 16.8
Malaysia 31.3 85.4 1.4 17.5
Philippines 32.3 32.3 3.7 16.6
Singapore 20.8 23.3 0.1 6.5
Taipei,China 11.7 13.2 0.0 2.8
Thailand 16.5 20.3 2.0 12.7
Australia 25.2 68.3 8.0 25.0
Germany 40.3 93.3 0.6 23.4
Japan 97.2 136.9 0.7 8.3
U.K. 33.1 60.8 0.9 25.8
U.S. 88.8 159.5 1.5 9.6
Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics, IMF World Economic Outlook Database, Bank for
International Settlements
† End of year data, 1998.
The design of government secur ities should be as simple as possible without complicated
covenants and it should be consistent across the maturities that comprise the benchmark yield
curve. This will facilitate pricing of the risk-free rate without the distraction of special features
such as sinking funds, call options or other features.
It is crucial that the interest rate on government bonds be market-determined, not
administratively determined. If the government attempts to manipulate the bond market to
reduce the cost of government borrowing, important information will be lost which may lead to
distortions in the allocation of capital. This means that the government should not require certain
institutions to hold its debt or devise special tax treatment of government debt that differs from
                                                
9 The United States, for example, is currently reducing the effective maturity of its outstanding debt. Because the
U.S. has a highly-developed bond market with abundant issues by government-sponsored enterprises that serve
as close substitutes for government debt, it may be able to reduce gross debt without undermining the efficiency
of the bond market. This would not be a wise policy in an emerging market, however.
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that for other securities. Here again, there is a natural tension between the objectives of nurturing
the development of a robust bond market and minimizing the cost of government borrowing.
Generally the price discovery process is enhanced by combining competitive auctions of
new issues with issuance through a set of primary dealers who act as underwriters. It is useful to
invite foreign firms to become primary dealers on the same basis as domestic firms. This is
likely to speed the adoption of world-class best practices in the local bond market and enhance
the access of domestic borrowers to longer-term foreign sources of funds. Primary dealers
should be required to make markets in the issues by continuously quoting a bid-ask spread and
standing ready to buy or sell at the stated rates.
Although the government will find a natural constituency for its longer-term issues in the
portfolios of institutions with longer-term liabilities, such placements will not facilitate the
development of a liquid secondary market because these institutions are likely to buy and hold
bonds until they mature. Thus, it is important to attract other investors who will have a trading
mentality. Mutual funds, for example, should be encouraged to enter the market.
Nurturing a strong secondary market
The liquidity of an asset is enhanced if it is traded in a liquid secondary market. Even if the asset
is not sold, the liquidity of the secondary market increases its value as collateral for a loan
because its worth can be more easily verified. Liquid secondary markets also raise the value of
primary securities.10 Confidence in the liquidity of secondary markets provides a valuable option
to investors. Even if the investor does not plan to sell the primary claim before maturity, the
investor’s future portfolio allocation preferences are inevitably subject to uncertainty and thus
the availability of a deep, broad secondary market enhances the investor’s willingness to buy the
initial, primary claim.
Empirical evidence suggests that this option may be very valuable indeed. Pratt (1989)
reports comparisons of the value of letter stocks that are identical in all respects to the freely
traded stock of public companies except that they are restricted from trading on the open market
for a specified period.11 Pratt (1989, p.241) concludes that “compared to their free-trading
counterparts, the discounts on the letter stocks were the least for NYSE-listed stocks, and
increased in order for AMEX-listed stock, OTC reporting companies, and OTC non-reporting
companies.” This ranking of discounts corresponds roughly to perceptions of the liquidity of
these secondary markets. Using the midpoints of the discount range for letter stocks relative to
their freely traded counterparts, Pratt found that the discount was 25.8%.12
The “liquidity of a secondary market” is usually described in terms of its depth and
breadth. “Depth” connotes the quantity that can be sold without moving prices against the seller.
“Breadth” connotes the diversity of participants and the heterogeneity of their responses to new
information. Both qualities are usually positively correlated with the size of the secondary
                                                
 10 When Citibank introduced the Certificate of Deposit, it was careful to make arrangements with dealers to establish
active secondary markets in which CDs could be traded.
 11 Publicly-traded corporations issue letter stock frequently in making acquisitions or raising capital when the time
and cost of registering the new stock with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) would make the
transaction impractical. Even though such stock cannot be offered to the public on the open market, it may be sold in
private transactions under certain circumstances. Such transactions must be reported to the SEC where they become
a matter of public record. Pratt (1989, p.240)
 12 Fernando (1990) derives an analytic expression for the magnitude of the liquidity premium (the return discount
investors will accept in equilibrium) in which the liquidity premium increases with market size, converging to a limit
as the size of the market approaches infinity. The limit depends on the variance of the personal subjective shock
distribution and the coefficient of absolute risk-aversion.
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market. Deep, broad markets are generally more resilient against disturbances of any given size
than thin, narrow markets; they tend to display greater price stability in response to a shock of a
given magnitude.
Liquid secondary markets are also “transactionally efficient” in the sense that the cost of a
round-trip (the bid-asked spread) is low (Guttentag and Herring (1986)). Dealer markets are
usually regarded as especially transactionally efficient because in addition to providing
information and matching buyers and sellers, dealers also provide immediacy by buying and
selling from inventory. The bid-asked spread charged by dealers in secondary markets must
cover the opportunity cost of maintaining an inventory of securities, operating costs, and the risk
of holding an inventory of securities. Greater price stability, which is associated with deep,
broad markets, reduces the risk of inventorying securities and thus reduces transaction costs.
A government can track its progress in fostering a liquid secondary market by tracking
the spreads quoted by dealers. The smaller the spread and the larger the size of the transaction
that dealers are willing to undertake at the quoted spread, the more liquid the secondary
market.
The liquidity of an asset also depends on the reliability of arrangements for exchanging
the asset for cash. Heightened perception of “settlement risk” – the risk that one party in a
transaction will fulfill its settlement obligation while the counterparty does not – can undermine
the liquidity of an asset. In these respects the liquidity of an asset depends on the liquidity of its
secondary market. In this instance emerging markets may have an advantage over some well-
established markets with legacy clearing and settlement systems. They have the opportunity to
leapfrog traditional arrangement by adopting modern technology to facilitate clearing and
settlement of secondary market trading. Hong Kong, China, for example, has established a
computerized book-entry system for bonds to reduce clearing and settlement risk. This book-
entry system is linked to a real-time gross settlement payment system so that it can provide real
time delivery against payment for Hong Kong, China dollar debt securities.
While there are many measures a government can implement to enhance the liquidity of
its secondary markets, the scope for success is inherently constrained by the size of the economy.
Most European economies have not been of sufficient size to foster broad, deep, resilient bond
markets like those found in the United States. Early experience within the euro area, however,
indicates that the combined bond market denominated in euros may indeed grow to rival U.S.-
dollar-denominated markets. This raises the interesting question of whether Asia might be able
to achieve similar gains through the development of a regional bond market.
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5. Conclusion: The Example of Thailand
The Thai economy is illustrative of both the problems we identified in Section 3 and the
solutions we outlined in Section 4. Before the crisis of 1997, Thailand had a highly-developed
banking sector and a buoyant stock market, but a moribund bond market (see Table 11).
Table 11: Size of Thai Financial Markets
                                                                                                               Unit: billion baht
Bank Loans Stock Market
Capitalization
Bond Outstanding
(Domestic)
GDP
1992 2,161.9 1,485.0 215.1 2,830.9
1993 2,665.2 3,325.4 262.0 3,170.3
1994 3,430.5 3,300.8 339.0 3,634.5
1995 4,230.5 3,564.6 424.4 4,185.6
1996 4,825.1 2,559.6 519.3 4,608.5
1997 6,037.5 1,133.3 546.8 4,727.3
1998 5,372.3 1,268.2 941.3 4,636.0
1999 5,119.0 2,193.1 1,388.6 4,688.3
Source: Thai Bond Dealing Center
The underdevelopment of the Thai bond market can be attributed to several causes (see
Table 12). First is the lack of a benchmark, market-determined yield curve. Until the crisis,
the Thai government had a tradition, dating from 1988, of fiscal surpluses. No government
bonds were issued from June 1990 until 1998, when the government was forced to run
significant deficits in an effort to rebuild the economy. Prior to the crisis, the government
viewed issuance of bonds solely as a means of financing deficits rather than as a way of
nurturing the development of a bond market.
Second, the Thai government had constructed a captive market for its securities. Banks
and finance companies were required to hold substantial reserves in the form of national
government securities. Most of these securities were held to maturity. This discouraged
secondary market trading and meant that the interest rate did not reflect the true opportunity
cost of funds.
Third, tax laws impeded the development of the secondary market. Until 1995 Thailand
imposed a stamp duty on transfers of bond ownership. Although the rate was low,
approximately 0.1 percent of the value of the bond, it was a powerful deterrent to secondary
market trading (Emery (1997)).
Fourth, a weak legal infrastructure created doubts about creditor rights in the event of
default. One Asian Development Bank (1999) governance paper points out: “Many Thai
observers noted that there are certain aspects of Thai culture that will make it difficult to
eliminate corruption, such as strong deference to hierarchy and authority, a general aversion
to confrontation, the expectation of rewarding followers, and a belief that wealth and position
are naturally and intrinsically linked.” Although Thailand ranked relatively well in terms of
creditor rights (see Table 8.A), it ranked poorly in terms of judicial effectiveness. There have,
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Table 12: Thailand’s Structural Problems and Consequences
on the Development of the Bond Market
Weak Legal Infrastructure
Weak Accounting Standards
Tradition of Fiscal Surpluses
Liquid Asset Requirement
Tax and Stamp Duty
Limited Disclosure
Captive Market
Low Supply of Public Debt
Low Demand
Lack of Market-
Determined
Benchmark Interest
Rate
Underdevelopment
of
PRIMARY MARKET
Underdevelopment
of
SECONDARY MARKET
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however, been drastic recent improvements in the legal infrastructure of Thailand. The
National Assembly approved the new constitution on September 27, 1997 and the amended
Bankruptcy Act became effective in April 1998. Earlier this year, creditors won a landmark
victory in the bankruptcy case of Thailand’s biggest corporate debtor.
Fifth, weak accounting and disclosure standards impeded the evaluation of credit risk
and made it difficult for external investors to value risky debt. Table 8.C shows that
accounting standards in Thailand rank below average among the eight Asian emerging
economies. Again, there have been recent efforts to correct this weakness. Based on a study
funded by the Asian Development Bank, Thailand launched its first credit rating agency, the
Thai Rating and Information Services Company Limited (TRIS) in 1993. The ownership of
TRIS is widely spread among commercial banks, finance companies, securities companies,
the Thai government, and multilateral agencies. TRIS rates both debt securities and
companies. All public debt offerings with maturity greater than one year require a rating from
TRIS.13
The underdevelopment of the bond market may have caused serious distortions in the
Thai economy. Without a market-determined interest rate that reflected true opportunity cost
of funds, and with bank loan rates marked-up over deposit rates that were administratively
determined, there was a tendency for Thai firms to over-invest. As a result, the efficiency of
investment declined. Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (1998) report that the median return on
assets for Thai firms declined steadily from 11.7 percent in 1990 to 7.4 percent in 1996. Alba,
Claessens, and Djankov (1998) report four indicators of enterprise performance, using data
for all firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand, that indicate Thai corporate
performance had been deteriorating well before the 1997 financial crisis (see Table 13).
The inadequacies of the bond market may have contributed to the heavy reliance of
Thai firms on family group corporate structures. Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (1998)
documented that 46.85 percent of Thai firms were affiliated with corporate groups in 1996.
In the absence of an efficient bond market, firms relied heavily on foreign borrowing.
Table 14 shows the evolution of foreign debt of the Thai private sector from 1987-1999.
Between 1988-1995 it grew at rates ranging from 20 to 65 percent per annum. With limited
access to relevant derivatives markets and risk management tools, foreign borrowing led to
excessive build up of foreign exchange risk that contributed to the 1997 financial crisis.
One consequence of the underdeveloped state of the bond market was that the Thai
economy was heavily reliant on bank lending. Table 1 shows in the year before the crisis,
bank lending accounted for nearly all external funding of investment. The consequence of
this dependence on bank lending was catastrophic for the economy. When the banks suffered
heavy losses, new lending ceased and firms were forced to halt investment projects. The
result was a prolonged and painful economic contraction.
The Thai authorities have learned a costly lesson about the dangers of over-reliance on
banks. They have begun to implement reforms designed to stimulate development of both the
primary and secondary bond markets. The Bank of Thailand has made an effort to introduce a
quarter-ahead calendar of regular issuance of government bonds in the primary market and
with the government taking on responsibility for many of the costs of financial sector
restructuring there is likely to be no shortage of supply. The Bank of Thailand has succeeded
in developing a yield curve for government bonds that extends from less than one year out to
fifteen years.
                                                
13 In 1999, the Thai Securities and Exchange Commission passed a resolution requiring private placement debt
of more than 100 million baht to be rated.
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Table 13: Deteriorating Corporate Performance of Thai Firms
Profits over
Interest
Expenses
No. of Firms with
Profits < Interest
Expenses
(%)
Loans of Firms
with Profits <
Interest Expenses
(%)
Profits over
Liabilities
(%)
Leverage
1997:Q4 1.49 32.0 36.4 7.3 2.95
1997:Q3 2.59 23.3 30.8 10.2 2.95
1997:Q2 3.18 19.9 18.4 NA 2.12
1997:Q1 3.66 15.3 16.2 NA 2.01
1996:Q4 3.11 13.8 11.8 14.9 1.90
1995:Q4 4.01 9.6 7.6 18.1 1.67
1994:Q4 5.78 5.1 1.4 24.0 1.50
Note: Profit is defined as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA).
Leverage is debt over equity.
Source: Alba, Claessens, and Djankov (1998)
Table 14: Foreign Debt of Thai Private Sector
                                                                                                                     Unit: $ million
Long-term Short-term Total Growth
1987 3,175 2,894 6,069 -2.7%
1988 3,282 4,492 7,774 28.1%
1989 4,966 5,777 10,743 38.2%
1990 7,633 10,160 17,793 65.6%
1991 10,382 14,686 25,068 40.9%
1992 12,189 18,364 30,553 21.9%
1993 15,302 22,634 37,936 24.2%
1994 20,153 28,999 49,152 29.6%
1995 25,155 41,011 66,166 34.6%
1996 36,172 37,559 73,731 11.4%
1997 34,855 34,238 69,093 -6.3%
1998 31,293 23,373 54,666 -20.9%
1999 25,506 13,546 39,052 -28.6%
Source: Bank of Thailand
In June 1999, the Bank of Thailand allowed financial institutions to conduct Securities
Borrowing and Lending (SBL) business, which should help promote risk management and
market liquidity. It will also institute a code of conduct for market participants, which will
include the establishment of a Market Committee to settle any disagreements between
participants in the secondary market.
The Bank of Thailand is developing a primary dealership system to facilitate the
conduct of open market operations. Primary dealers will eventually make a market for both
government and private securities. Thailand will also introduce an Inter-dealer Broker System
(IDB) to facilitate transactions between dealers, and the Repurchase Market will be expanded.
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In addition, the Bank of Thailand plans to launch a fully automated delivery versus
payment (DVP) settlement system in 2001. It will be supplemented by the intra-day liquidity
facilities and queuing mechanism, employing digital signature technology to ensure secure
and smooth real-time delivery and payment transaction.
As the Thai example shows, bond markets matter for financial development. Certainly, an
economy can grow rapidly without an active bond market. But the cost is an increased
vulnerability to a financial crisis and a loss of information to guide savings and investment
decisions. Heavy reliance on banks means a correspondingly heavy exposure to banking crises.
And the consequence can be catastrophic for the real economy. But the example of Thailand
also shows that it may be possible to rebuild the financial system with an expanded role for the
bond market.
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